Winter on Lake Huron |
In the last post in this series I talked about the next financial crash and how it may well be serious enough to spread into the non-financial sectors of the economy and effect supply chains and critical systems in ways that we did not see in the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08. Systems that most of us depend on for the necessities of life may fail and many kollapsniks see this leading immediately and inevitably to a hard, fast and permanent crash of industrial civilization.
I disagree, seeing this as just one more bump on the road down, the cyclic pattern of crash and partial recovery that I believe will characterize the rest of the age of scarcity.
To understand why I hold this opinion, I said we need to do a couple of things:
1) take a systems dynamic approach to the events we are talking about. Specifically, we need to look at what happens when overshoot occurs in nature, in systems like the one we inhabit. Which is, after all, a subset of the ecosphere. Overshoot is a common enough phenomenon and usually works in fairly predictable ways.
2) look at the sort of things governments, communities and individuals can do to limit the damage of a financial crash and its spread to other critical systems.
Today we are going to do that.
(Note: all three of the graphs below are smoothed out, idealized and imprecise representations of the processes they illustrate. The point is to allow me to make some points visually. I hope not to get into much in the way of quibbling over minor details, of which no doubt a few are missing, inaccurate or outright wrong.)
So, first, let's take a look at how overshoot works. Take moment or two with your favourite search engine and you will find a graph that looks something like this:
1) typical overshoot situation with constant carrying capacity
The green line shows the behaviour over time of the population of a species which finds itself initially at a level well below the carrying capacity of its environment (the dashed blue line). Because that environment provides lots of whatever the species need to grow, it does grow. This tendency to grow in response to favourable conditions seems to be an inhernet property of life. As is always the case, this is exponential growth—it starts out slowly but eventually reaches a point where it takes off and quickly exceeds the carrying capacity of the environment.
What happens then is interesting, especially since we currently find ourselves in just such a situation. You get some oscillation of the species population, above and below the carrying capacity, until it finally settles out somewhat below the carrying capacity.
First, let's be clear that it is possible to exceed carrying capacity in the short run, at the cost of damaging the environment and reducing its capacity—overpopulation has a negative effect on that capacity. There is also some time delay built in to the effect of population growth, as newly born individuals add relatively little to the species impact on the environment compared to what they will add once they have grown up. The negative feedback and the time delay result in the oscillation shown in the graph.
Of course, the straight line representing carrying capacity would actually have some peaks and valleys, corresponding to how the environment responds to the stress of overpopulation and how it recovers when the population falls. If we idealized both the blue and green lines into something like a sine wave, we would see that the variation in the carrying capacity leads the variation in the population by about 90 degrees.
The red line, by the way, represents a fast and permanent collapse. In order for this to happen the carrying capacity has to fall all the way down to basically nothing. This can happen for a variety of reasons, but overshoot isn't one of them, because as soon as the population falls off below the carrying capacity, the stress on the environment is relieved and it begins to recover.
There is, in fact, no such thing as a "balance of nature" and it is by no means inevitable that the oscillations damp out and the population settles down just below the carrying capacity. In many cases what we actually get is the situation in the next graph, where populations oscillate on an ongoing basis.
2) continual oscillation of predator and prey populations such as foxes and rabbits
You might think that the population of rabbits and foxes in an ecosystem would level out at steady values, but that is not in fact what is observed.
If we start at a moment when there are relatively few of each species, we see that the population of rabbits (the prey, dashed blue line) grows rapidly. It is well below the carrying capacity of the ecosystem for rabbits and there are relatively few foxes (the predators, green line). But the increasing number of rabbits make hunting easier for the foxes, and their population starts to increase too. Eventually there are enough foxes to overhunt the rabbits, resulting in a crash in the rabbit population. This is followed by a crash in the fox population, since there are no longer enough rabbits to support it. This brings us back to where we started and the cycle carries on.
The reason the cycle can carry on indefinitely is that the foxes limit the rabbit population so that it never exceeds the carrying capacity of the ecosystem for rabbits—the plants the rabbits are eating never get over grazed.
The situation for the human population of this planet is, as you might expect, more complex.
The impact (I) that the human population has on our environment is determined not just by the size of that population (P), but also by the level of affluence (A) we are living at and effectiveness of the technology (T) we are using to maintain that affluence.
This gives us the famous equation, I=PAT. Since I am going to be using the term "T" in another equation shortly, I'll change this to I=PAD, where "D" stands for decoupling. Decoupling is the use of technology to produce affluence at a lower cost to thge environment and it is a number between 0 and 1, with 0 being the goal we would aim for, eliminating our impact altogether. In fact it is proving so difficult to get decoupling anywhere near zero that it is very unlikely to be the solution to our problems.
Carrying capacity (C) also works somewhat differently for human populations.
We can increase the size (S) of our environment by expanding into new areas of the world and habitats previously occupied by other species or by "indigenous" humans.
We can tap into forms of energy (E) beyond just food. For somewhere between two and three million years we've been using fire for landscaping, for cooking our food and for heating our shelters. In each case we were using the energy in burning biomass to increase the carrying capacity of our environment, increase the value of our food, and/or expand the range of environments that we can live in. For the last few hundred years we've been using the energy of fossil fuels to radically increase the carrying capacity of our environment in many seemingly clever ways.
Since whatever method we use to acquire energy consumes energy in the process, it's actually the energy that is left over, available for use (the surplus energy) that's important. This is best expressed as "Energy Returned on Energy Invested", EROEI. This is a dimensionless number and the larger it is, the more surplus energy. When the EROEI is equal to one, the process is just breaking even and there is no point in doing it—we want a much higher EROEI.
Hunter-gather and pre-industrial agricultural societies managed average EROEI's in the high single digits at best. Industrial societies based on fossil fuels in the twentieth century had EROEI's many times that high, which made possible high levels of growth and the development and use of technologies which had previously been completely out of reach. Today the average global EROEI is around 11.
Which brings us to our use of tools and technology (T). With just Neolithic technology (fire, stone tools, weaving, tanning, pottery, boats, agriculture) we spread over the whole planet except for the Antarctic, occupying and thriving in environments very different from the ones where we evolved. Since the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution our use of technology has exploded. And not just material technology, but financial, organizational and information technologies as well. All of which has enabled both our population and affluence to grow at heretofore unprecedented rates.
So, the carrying capacity of this planet for the human race can be represented by the equation C=SET. Clearly, I (Impact) must be less than C (carrying capacity) or we are in overshoot. And since sometime in the late 1970s we have indeed been in overshoot. Currently the level of overshoot is around 60%. That is, our impact on the environment is 1.6 times what can be sustained on an ongoing basis.
3) oscillating overshoot with declining carrying capacity
From left side of this graph to point "a" we see the long and very slow growth of the human population before the discovery of the New World. After point "a" the carrying capacity began to increase significantly as the size of our environment effectively took a large jump with the European settlement of the New World, as the use of fossil fuels greatly increased the amount of surplus energy available and as we developed numerous new technologies to use that energy. Human impact increased with the carrying capacity, as our population grew and affluence increased.
The growth of carrying capacity continued until the last quarter of the twentieth century, point "b", when depletion of fossil fuels and reduction of their EROEI, diminishing returns on technological innovation and stress on the environment from human activities started to reduce the carrying capacity.
Human impact has continued to grow since then, and is now so far above carrying capacity that one has to expect a crash in the near future, point "c". As I said in my last post, this is likely to start with a financial crash. The financial sector of the economy, since it deals largely with non-material things that don't have much inertia, can change very quickly. It is currently under a lot of strain from huge amounts of risky debt. I favour a scenario where a spike in the price of oil, brought about as the current surplus of oil bottoms out, sets off a currency crash in one of more countries, leading to a wave of bankruptcies and governments defaulting on their debts. After point "c" human impact will start to decrease rapidly, primarily due to the effect of the financial crash on affluence.
Note that I have again included a red line (and a light blue line), which represent a fast and permanent crash of both carrying capacity and population. This is possible and some would argue that climate change and ocean acidification (among other things) may be damaging the environment enough to make it the most likely outcome. I don't think so. The ecosphere is amazingly resilient, once human impact is reduced. People have gotten the wrong impression about this because we have been playing the silly game of upping our impact and then wondering why the situation keeps gets worse, as if it wasn't our fault.
To the right is a little chart that contains some shocking information. The top 20% of the human population (in terms of affluence) is responsible for 76.6% of our impact. A financial crash will be very hard on those top 20% and in the process will drastically reduce human impact. Sadly, myself and most of my readers are in that top 20%.
Referring back to diagram 3, I expect that at point "d", where "I" is finally less than "C", the carrying capacity will begin to recover, and a while later at point "e", human impact will begin to increase once again as well.
Remember also that carrying capacity is defined by C=SET, and there is much that humanity can do to change the value of "T" in that equation. I am by no means saying that we will find a "solution" to our problems based on material technology. What I mean is that a major factor in the big decrease in carrying capacity during the upcoming crash will be the failure of our financial and organizational technology to cope with the situation. And there is a lot we can do to reorganize our financial, economic and political systems to work better under the new conditions. Once we are forced to do it. So I do expect there will be a recovery after this crash.
It is very likely that during the crash the financial chaos will spread to the rest of the economy and that there will be some reduction in the growth rate of our population as the support structures provide by industrial civilization fail completely in some parts of the world. But it seems likely that human population will continue to grow until it once again outstrips carrying capacity, at point "f". And then at point "g" we will have another crash. I suspect depletion of fossil fuels, water for irrigation and phosphorous for fertilizer, and the effects of climate change will lead to a collapse of agriculture in many parts of the world. Famine and epidemics will at that point start to rapidly reduce our population and eventually reduce it back below a once more reduced carrying capacity (point "h") and another recovery will begin (point "i").
Beyond point "i" it is hard to say much about exact details or how many more crashes will take place. But the trend of continued oscillation with decreases in both carrying capacity and human impact will continue. The downward trend is because our current system relies on non-renewable resources that we are using up. That trend will continue until our impact can be sustained solely by renewable resources. Along the way we will go through some very hard times (point "i" and subsequent valleys in the green line) because of the damage done to the planet in the process. But eventually, with our impact drastically reduced, the ecosystems will recover. I expect that at this point we will have retained some of our technology and because of this the overall carrying capacity and our population/impact will settle out a bit above what it was in pre-industrial times.
One further thing I want to emphasize is how uneven this whole process will be. Yes it is likely that the impending financial crash, because it involves systems that are highly interconnected and global in scale, will be felt to some extent over the whole planet. But the degree to which the financial chaos spreads to the rest of the economy will vary greatly from place to place. And subsequent crashes, once the high degree of global interconnection has been broken, will most likely occur at different times in different places.
Wherever people are not completely dependent on global supply chains, the effects will be less severe. To the extent that they are not ravaged by climate change, some parts of the developing world where subsistence agriculture is practiced may continue on with little change. Unfortunately many areas will suffer the ravages of climate change—droughts, flooding and heat waves. Many countries (particularly in Africa and the Middle East) do not produce enough food for their own populations. With supply chains broken and agriculture struggling everywhere, these areas will find it difficult to continue importing the food they rely on. Supplies of energy and water will also prove problematical.
I am well aware that all these graphs and explanations do not constitute a proof of my assertions about the bumpy road down. But I hope I have succeeded in making what I'm trying to say much clearer. It's up to you to decide if there is anything to it or not, now that you know what "it" is.
The other area I wanted to touch on today is the sort of things governments, communities and individuals can do to limit the damage when a financial crash spreads to other critical systems.
As the financial crash starts to gain momentum, governments will (to whatever extent they can) use the same tools as they did in 2008 to get things under control— loans and bailouts for faltering businesses, and keeping interest rates very low. It also seems likely that, as the situation worsens, "bail-ins" will be used as well, where depositors are required to accept discounts on their deposits to reduce the pressure on failing banks. And "haircuts" where bond holders have to accept discounts on the value of those bonds in order to reduce the pressure on the governments that issued them.
These efforts will have mixed results and the crash will no doubt spread to the non-financial sectors of the economy. Many governments will try switching failing critical systems over to a direct command “martial law” economy. This will be done with varying degrees of skill (or ineptitude as the case may be) and varying degrees of co-operation from their citizens. Vital materials which are in short supply due to supply chain and production breakdowns will be placed under government control and rationed (food, energy—especially diesel fuel, water treatment and medical supplies), and attempts will be made to patch supply chains and production facilities back together with whatever comes to hand.
I have no doubt that this can be made to work, at least to some extent. It does require convincing the public that it is necessary and that it is being done fairly—applied equally to the rich and powerful as it is to the poor and weak. And inevitably there will be thriving black markets.
Governments that already operate some of these systems directly will be better prepared and experience greater success. System that have been contracted out to the lowest bidder—companies that are primarily responsible to their stock holders rather than their customers—may fail in a variety of ghastly ways.
On the other hand, I think there will also be quite a bit of quiet heroism on the part of companies and individuals in critical industries whose job it is to keep things working. These folks are for the most part competent and highly motivated, and their efforts will be more successful than you might think.
Some governments will be so successful that their citizens may hardly be aware that anything is going on. In other countries, people will be reduced to relying almost entirely on what can be done locally, with locally available resources. Right wing capitalist governments whose primary obligation is to the rich and power will begin to practice wholesale abandonment of the poor and unfortunate.
There are also things that can be done by local communities, families and individuals to be more self sufficient—to be able to carry on during those periods when industrial society fails to supply the necessities. Increasing local inventories in order to be more resilient in response to supply chain failures would be a good beginning. But just being clear about what the necessities are and not wasting resources try to maintain luxuries will be one of the biggest challenges. The first step is realizing that much of what we consider necessary is, in fact, not.
So, as I've already said, I'm expecting a recovery, or rather a series of recoveries after a series of crashes. These crises are going to cause some changes in the way things work, resulting in a very different world. We'll have a look at the trends that will lead to that new world in my next post.
P.S.
If Blogger's statistics and Google Analytics are right, a lot of people are reading this blog on mobile devices. I'd be interested to hear how the graphics in this post worked on those devices.
Links to the rest of this series of posts:
Political Realities / Collapse Step by Step / The Bumpy Road Down
- Collapse Step-by-Step, Part 1: Unevenly, Unsteadily and Unequally , Tuesday, 23 May 2017
- Collapse Step by Step, Part 2: End Points, Friday, 16 June 2017
- Collapse Step by Step, Part 3: Political Compasses , Saturday, 29 July 2017
- Collapse Step by Step, Part 4: Political Positions, Sunday, 6 August 2017
- Collapse Step by Step, Part 5: Political Realities, Wednesday, 30 August 2017
- Collapse Step by Step, Part 6: More on Political Realities, Monday, 9 October 2017
- Collapse Step by Step, Part 7: More on Political Realities, Continued, Friday, 13 October 2017
- Collapse Step by Step, Part 8--The Bumpy Road Down, Part 1, Sunday, 26 November 2017
- The Bumpy Road Down, Part 2, Sunday, 7 January 2018
- The Bumpy Road Down, Part 3, Monday, 15 January 2018
- The Bumpy Road Down, Part 4: Trends in Collapse, Friday, 26 January 2018
- The Bumpy Road Down, Part 5: More Trends in Collapse, Tuesday, 20 February 2018
15 comments:
Best one in the series so far Irv, IMHO.
RE
Thanks, RE. Your opinion means a lot to me. I am a very visual thinker and I find graphics can work very well to get a message across to me. I hope the same will be true for others.
So what is the limit on the decoupled technology factor? Catton in Overshoot qualitatively discussed these multiple changes in technology that allowed changes in carrying capacity, so what might the limit be on that factor? Obviously the Earth isn't a closed system, so it would seem impossible to discount growth beyond the Earth just as we can't discount solar flux.
Good post, Irv. I think you'e nailed it pretty well and the explanations and graphs were easy to understand. I'm a visual thinker too.
I think climate change will be an unknown and no-one could successfully factor in that one. We don't know if there will be a tipping point at which the whole thing goes belly-up regardless of what we do or how we change.
As the saying goes "we live in interesting times".
Hi Mirv.... great article, I've republished it on my damnthematrix blog where we discuss this stuff a lot.
The graphics on my phone are fine BTW.
Keep up the good work.
Mike in Australia.
@ReserveGrowthRulz
Not sure what you are getting at.
Some people (eco-modernists and cornucopians, etc.) think decoupling via improved technology can allow us to continue growing. But to allow continued exponential growth takes a lot of decoupling, way more than we could ever reasonably achieve.
@foodnstuff
Nice to hear from you Bev! And good points.
There are so many unknowns that no one can really make reliable predictions. I am just a putting forward an alternative to the equally unreliable prediction of sudden and permanent collapse that I keep hearing.But note that the end result is much the same in both cases. My version just takes longer and may give a few people more chance to adapt.
@damnthematrix
Thanks for cross publishing my post Mike. Don't be too disappointed if I don't put a lot of effort into responding to negative comments. Live and let live, and all that.
IRV - Good analysis. Watching the stock market bubble here in the states since 2009 gives credence to your position. Many prognosticators have proclaimed that this will continue for . . .(ever?) Am not an economist, but it looks very shaky. When the "market" falls it will probably crash the financial system in most of the world. As you say we will recover to an extent that is less than what we had prior to the crash. On the other hand, predicting the future is usually a fool's game. Best regards, Russ
Thanks for your kind words, Russ.
I try not predict anything that isn't already happening. Doesn't eliminate the foolishness, but keeps it to a minimum.
Very nice post Irv; you lay out the issue of carrying capacity very clearly.
Where I would disagree with your analysis is in the increase in the carrying capacity after a precipitous decline in human impact. Since human carrying capacity is dependent on E (energy) and T (technology) that are not found in purely biological systems, carrying capacity will not automatically rebound once the human impact declines below carrying capacity.
The carrying capacity for the lynx automatically rebounds with the decrease in the hare population, but fossil fuel production and technological infrastructure are not going to suddenly increase (point d to point f in your third chart) just because human population and living standards plummet. Hare populations depend on their biotic potential and on their food supply, neither of which have been affected by their population decline at the claws of the lynx population. Human carrying capacity now depends on resources that cannot rebound on their own, but, as you note, depend on complex human endeavor to maintain the extraction process.
In fact, it is more likely that as industrial civilization takes that first big step down, carrying capacity will fall even faster due to an increasing inability to maintain high tech resource extraction and processing facilities. Energy and technology are going to be victims of a 'receding horizons' phenomenon. As energy availability declines, it will force technological simplification, which will cause energy availability to decline even faster.
One might argue that as such things as fracking and deepwater extraction become impossible in the oil sector, for example, that legacy oil fields, such as Ghawar, could be more intensively drilled by simpler drilling technology and thereby more than compensate for the loss of more technologically demanding sources. But then we would need much more in the way of transportation infrastructure to get that oil to far flung users around the world. How would we dramatically increase our supertanker fleet, our pipeline systems, and local distribution systems under the circumstances of a collapsing civilization?
I think you need to provide more rationale than just a change to a command economy to explain why energy and technological resources can begin increasing again, even while civilization is collapsing and simplifying. Rather than a modified lynx and hare model for human carrying capacity change, I would suggest a St. Matthews Island reindeer model as being the most probable. Fossil fuels are our lichen.
Typo in my previous comment; should be "increase in the hare population".
Thanks, Joe, for taking time to get so deep into my analysis of the collapse. Not many have done so.
Here is some additional rational for the first recovery after the initial crash:
The bottom out of carrying capacity at point "d" rather than much lower happens because what has been falling is the T element in C=SET. And mainly the financial part of that technology. The material side of our technology, while it may have been temporarily shut down, is still there and ready to be used again once the chaos settles down after the initial crash.
During the crash I think that we'll see the demand for oil drop more quickly than the natural decline rate of our oil supplies and the price fall even further than it did in the last few years. We won't be using nearly so much oil as at present, so we will once again accumulate a surplus, and we'll even leave some reserves of oil in the ground, at least initially. This will help drive a recovery after the depression bottoms out (point "e" in the diagram). Please note that I am talking about the remaining relatively high EROEI conventional oil here. Unconventional sources just don't produce enough surplus energy to fuel a recovery.
I come from a trades background and am intimately familiar with the material side of our industrial civilization. The guys in suits, so to speak, are going to fall apart. But those of us in coveralls with a wrench in our hands stand ready to get things going again.
Of course that recover will be followed by another collapse, and I think it will be more like the collapse you and lots of others are expecting.
You'll see more detailed discussion of this in my next two posts.
And of course, Joe, we're talking abut a recovery happening at a much lower level of affluence than we now enjoy. Looking closely at my diagram, I'd say point "g" shouldn't have been quite so high--perhaps half way down towards point "f" from its current position.
That diagram was meant to be seen qualitatively, not with any sort of quantitative precision. But pick it apart all you like, it actually helps me toward a better understanding.
Irv,
I understand now why you foresee a rebound in carrying capacity. You are right that a financial collapse leaves the physical world intact, but I still think that without the smooth functioning of a global market most of those physical resources will remain idled.
I will read your next installment before commenting further.
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